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Abstract 
 
Increases in the school-age population, maximum class size requirements in various states and 
the No Child Left Behind Act’s mandate of a “highly qualified teacher” in every classroom 
collectively will increase the demand for teachers. However, public school teachers are exiting the 
profession in large numbers. This poses a serious challenge for policymakers.  In this paper I 
analyze the determinants of teacher attrition using matched teacher-student class-level information 
for all Florida public school teachers.  In addition to teacher demographics and school 
characteristics employed in previous studies, I include a number of variables measuring the 
characteristics of the specific students assigned to each teacher.  The results indicate that classroom 
characteristics, such as students’ performance on standardized tests and the average number of 
disciplinary incidents, play a larger role than school average student characteristics in determining 
teacher attrition. Teacher pay has a positive influence on retention, while the results for class size 
are mixed.  There is also some evidence that more able teachers are more likely to exit the teaching 
profession.  These findings suggest that in addition to salary, classroom assignment is an important 
factor when considering policies to promote teacher retention and teacher quality. 
 
 
 
 
1  Introduction 
The demand for public school teachers is rapidly increasing.  According to the National Center for 
Educational Statistics (NCES), total elementary and secondary school enrollment in the United States will  
_________________ 
*Department of Economics, 288 Bellamy Building, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2180.  Email: 
lff6254@garnet.acns.fsu.edu.  I wish to thank my major adviser, Dr. Tim Sass, for his direction and encouragement.  I 
would also like to thank the staff of Florida Department of Education’s K-20 Education Data Warehouse for their 
assistance in obtaining the data used in current study. This dissertation is partly funded by the American Education 
Research Association Dissertation Grant program. However, any views expressed in this paper are solely my own and 
do not necessarily reflect the views of Florida Department of Education or the American Education Research 
Association. 
2 
increase by four percent between 2002 and 2014.1  In addition, since the 1980s 24 states, including 
Florida, have implemented either voluntary or mandatory class size reduction initiatives.2  Further 
exacerbating the demand for new teachers, the No Child Left Behind Act requires that for every classroom 
there is a “highly qualified teacher” by the year 2006.3 
One important element in meeting the growing demand for teachers is to bolster efforts to train 
and hire well qualified teachers.  However, increasing the number of new recruits into teaching will do 
little to ameliorate looming teacher shortages unless new and existing teachers stay in the teaching 
profession.  On a national level, about eight percent of teachers stopped teaching from one year to the 
next; this percentage has been increasing since 1987.4  Among those who left teaching, only a quarter of 
them retired while half left for other professions or careers.  Some studies find attrition to be even higher 
for individual states.5 
Reducing teacher attrition also has potentially important implications for school finance.   
Searching for and hiring a new teacher is an expensive proposition.  In Texas, the cost of turnover per lost 
teacher based on the salary of first-year teachers is estimated to be between $6,060 and $48,480.6 The 
U.S. Department of Labor offers a middle range per-teacher turnover cost estimate of $7,999.7  
Despite the magnitude of the teacher attrition problem there is relatively scant empirical evidence 
on the factors affecting teachers’ exit decisions. In particular, there is little evidence on the impact of a 
teacher’s classroom environment, including student ability, student behavior and class size on teachers’ 
decisions to leave the profession.  It is the goal of this paper to fill this void.  By studying this issue, I will 
be able to provide evidence relevant to policymakers seeking ways to reduce teacher attrition in a cost-
effective manner. 
Attrition is just one component of teacher turnover.  Teachers may move from one school to 
another (migration) or exit the teaching profession entirely (attrition).  Since migration does not 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Education (2005). 
2 Education Commission of the States (2005). 
3 To be deemed highly qualified, teachers must have a bachelor’s degree, full state certification or licensure and 
provide evidence of content knowledge for each subject they teach. 
4 U.S. Department of Education (2004). 
5 For state-level analyses, see Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) and  Imazeki (2004). 
6 Texas Center for Educational Research (2000). The first estimate only includes the number of leavers and their 
annual salary in the calculation while the second estimate includes other factors such as separation costs, hiring costs, 
vacancy costs, training costs and learning curve loss. 
7 Texas Center for Educational Research (2000). 
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represent a net loss in the total supply of public school teachers, I analyze teacher attrition in the present 
research.8  In particular, I consider the impacts of both monetary and non-monetary factors affecting 
teacher attrition.  Unlike most prior research, which focuses on school-level characteristics, I investigate 
whether the specific classroom environment affects the probability an individual leaves teaching.  I 
estimate the impacts of class size, student ability, and student behavior on the probability of exiting 
teaching, while controlling for other factors such as teacher pay and ability.  
I utilize administrative data from the state of Florida for more than 127,000 public school 
teachers who taught during the 2001-2002 school year.  For each teacher, I have detailed information on 
their demographic characteristics, certification status, employment history and compensation.  For 
teachers who entered a Florida public university in 1999 or later I also possess information on their pre-
service history, including course work and college entrance exam scores.  These data are matched to the 
records of the students they taught.  In order to compare my results for Florida with the rest of the nation 
I also analyze data from the 1999-2000 School and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the associated 2000-2001 
Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS).9  
The remainder of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2 reviews the relevant 
literature. Section 3 lays out the empirical model and methodology. Section 4 describes the two sets of 
data used in the analysis, along with the advantages and disadvantages of each. Section 5 presents results 
for both the full sample of teachers as well as the subset of teachers who are in the early stage of their 
careers.  In the final section I discuss the policy implications of my research.  
2  Literature Review 
There is a substantial body of literature that studies the factors affecting teachers’ decisions to exit the 
teaching profession.  Past research can be categorized by the three general influences on teacher attrition:  
teacher ability, monetary job characteristics and the non-monetary aspects of teaching. 
                                                 
8 There are obviously important policy issues with respect to the distribution of teachers across schools.  For example, 
one concern is that schools serving minority or economically disadvantaged students may lose recruits and existing 
teachers to schools serving students from high-income families.  The second essay in my dissertation addresses the 
issue of teacher migration both within and between school districts. 
9 SASS is a random sample of all teachers in the U.S. and their whereabouts one year later. 
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Teacher Ability and Teacher Turnover  
The first group of studies, also the most limited in terms of the quantity of research produced, 
seeks to determine if teacher attrition affects the average quality of teachers as well as their total number.  
In other words, are high-quality teachers more likely to leave than their less able peers?10 Using Missouri 
public school data from 1990-2000, Podgursky et al. (2004) find that teachers with higher ACT scores 
have a higher probability of exiting the teaching profession. In a recent study of New York City teachers, 
Boyd et al. (2005) find that schools with low-performing students have a difficult time staffing high-
quality teachers, where quality is measured by performance on the general knowledge portion of the 
teacher certification exam.  
Salary and Teacher Turnover 
The second group of extant literature focuses on the monetary aspects of occupational choice for 
teachers, studying teachers’ salaries and the value of their outside (non-teaching employment) options. A 
handful of studies provide evidence that higher salaries are associated with higher teacher retention rates. 
Murnane and Olsen (1989a), using a sample of over 7,800 Michigan public-school teachers, show that a 
$1000 increase (1967 dollars) in salary is associated with an increase of more than four years in the 
median teaching spell duration for Michigan public school teachers.  Similar effects are found for a small 
sample of Colorado teachers (Murnane and Olsen (1989b)).  Using the National Longitudinal Study of the 
Class of 1972 and its follow-ups, Stinebrickner (1998) finds that a higher wage will lengthen teacher 
duration. Specifically, a person with wages that are one standard deviation above the mean is nine percent 
more likely to stay in teaching than a person with the mean wage during a five-year span. However, 
Stinebrickner’s analyses are based on a small sample of only 341 certified teachers.   
In addition, the opportunity cost of teaching can also affect teacher turnover. Brewer (1996) uses 
the ratio of the average countywide teacher salary divided by an individual teacher’s salary to indicate the 
outside teaching opportunities in other districts in the county. He finds that increases in alternative pay 
relative to current salary are positively correlated with quits.  Theobald and Gritz (1996) include a 
measure of the opportunity cost of teaching in the current school district—the average of alternative 
teacher salaries in all school districts within the state of Washington.  They find that higher alternative 
                                                 
10 Stinebrickner (2001), Podgursky et al. (2004), Boyd et al. (2005) all found that higher ability teachers have greater 
likelihood of exiting teaching profession. 
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salaries increase both male and female teacher attrition. Imazeki (2004) finds that the higher wage of an 
individual teacher relative to the average of the Cooperative Education Service Agencies in Wisconsin the 
less likely the teacher would exit. Similarly, Murnane and Olsen (1990) measure a teacher’s opportunity 
cost by their performance on the National Teacher Exam (NTE) and find that those with higher scores 
tend to have a shorter tenure as teachers.   
Non-monetary Job Characteristics and Teacher Turnover 
In addition to monetary compensation, a teacher’s utility will depend on the non-pecuniary 
aspects of her job, particularly the costs she incurs and the satisfaction she derives from teaching her 
students.  The last set of papers emphasizes these non-pecuniary aspects of teaching.  The existing 
literature primarily focuses on school-level and district-level characteristics and how they affect the 
employment decisions of teachers.  
Smith and Ingersoll (2004), Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004), Shen (1997) and Murnane et 
al.(1991) find that teachers from schools with a high proportion of minority students or a large fraction of 
students who are eligible for free and reduced-price lunch are more likely to leave. Hanushek, Kain and 
Rivkin (2004) find that Texas public school teachers prefer non-minority, non-low-income students 
regardless of the teachers’ gender, race and experience level.  However, African-American teachers favor 
schools with higher shares of black student enrollment.  Imazeki (2004) finds a similar preference among 
African-American teachers in Wisconsin.  
In terms of school-level average student achievement, Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) find 
that Texas public school teachers are less likely to exit schools with relatively high-achieving students. 
Contradicting the results in Texas, Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner (2003) find that Georgia public 
school teachers tend to flee schools with a large proportion of minority students while the impact of 
school-level student test scores on leaving is insignificant once student racial composition is taken into 
account.  In a recent analysis of the New York city school teachers, Boyd, et. al. (2005) find that high 
ability elementary school teachers have a strong preference for schools with high achieving students. 
Although the number of students a teacher must instruct likely affects the difficulty of the job, few 
studies of teacher attrition explicitly include class size in the analysis.  Indeed there has been no large-
scale study of the impact of teacher-specific class sizes on teacher attrition.  The one study to employ 
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teacher-specific class-size information, Mont and Rees (1996), analyzes 525 New York high school 
teachers and finds that smaller class sizes are associated with a reduced probability of leaving. In addition 
to the obvious sample size limitation, the estimates may suffer from omitted variable bias since no other 
school-level information on student composition is included.  Further, there is a potential endogeneity 
problem if less effective teachers are assigned fewer students.  What appear to be class-size effects may 
actually reflect unobserved teacher quality.  Using the school-level average student-teacher ratio, Kirby, 
Berends and Naftel (1999) corroborate the positive correlation between class size and teacher turnover.  
3  Model and Methodology 
A Model of Teachers’ Job Choice  
I model a teacher’s leaving/staying decision in a random utility framework, where a teacher chooses 
between staying in teaching and leaving teaching according to whichever decision provides higher utility.11 
The additive random utility function specifies the utilities of leaving (1) and staying (0) to be the sum of a 
deterministic and a random component: 
(1)  U0=V0+ ε0 
 U1=V1+ ε1 
Where V0 and V1 represent the deterministic components of utility and ε1 and ε0 represents the random 
components of utility. We observe the dependent variable y equal to one if the utility of leaving, U1, is 
higher than the utility of staying U0.   Because of the random component of utility, the probability of 
leaving (y=1) is a random event where F is the cumulative density function of (ε0 - ε1 ). Assuming ε0 and ε1 
are normally distributed and normalizing of the variance of (ε0 - ε1) to unity gives the probit model: 
(2) Pr[y=1] = Pr [U1 > U0  ] 
 = Pr [V1+ ε1 > V0+ ε0] 
 = Pr [ε0 - ε1 < V1 - V0] 
 = F (V1 - V0). 
As to the deterministic component of the model, there are many factors that may potentially affect the 
difference between utility in teaching and in other occupations and thus impact a teacher’s decision to 
                                                 
11 Cameron and Trivedi (2005).  
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leave. In general, the staying/leaving decision depends on individual tastes, geographic preferences, 
wages in the present job and in alternative employment, the non-pecuniary job characteristics of both 
teaching and alternative employment and the extent of human capital that is specific to the present job12. 
In order to make the model operational it is necessary to relate specific observable variables to the 
broad categories of factors determining the difference in utility between teaching and non-teaching 
employment.  While tastes/preferences are not directly observable, I shall use teacher demographics, 
including age, gender, race and ethnicity to proxy the preferences of teachers.  There are of course no 
apriori predictions for the impact of these variables on teacher attrition.  Educational attainment, in 
particular receipt of an advanced degree, will likely raise the alternative wage (holding teaching salary 
constant) and thus is expected to increase the likelihood a teacher will exit.  I employ two indicator 
variables to capture teaching-specific investments in human capital:  professional certification and special 
education teachers.  Both of these factors are expected to represent higher levels of teaching-specific skills 
and thus be associated with a reduced likelihood of exit.  In contrast, middle and high-school teachers in 
general, and math teachers in particular, are expected to have more general job skills that are transferable 
to non-teaching positions and thus more likely to exit, all else equal.  Monetary compensation is measured 
by a teacher’s current salary and general non-teaching wages are captured by a set of county dummy 
variables.13  Finally, non-pecuniary aspects of teaching are captured by a vector of school and classroom 
characteristics, including measures of student ability, disability status, English proficiency and student 
behavior.14  Presumably high-ability and well-behaved students are easier and more enjoyable to teach 
and thus would decrease the likelihood a teacher would exit.  While some past studies of teacher attrition 
have included school-level average student characteristics, my analysis will be the first large scale study to 
consider the characteristics of the specific students in a teacher’s classes. 
Given the assumptions above, the empirical model can be summarized by: 
(3) Pr[Exit] = f(D, T, S, C ) 
Where  D = a vector of teacher demographic characteristics, 
                                                 
12 See Farber(1999) for more details on job-specific human capital and job mobility. 
13 Since all Florida school districts are countywide, the county dummies will also serve to capture differences in hiring 
and firing policies and cost-of-living differences. 
14 I am not controlling for the home environment, particularly parental inputs.  Students who receive significant 
support at home may be easier to teach and less disruptive.  Hopefully LEP and poverty status can proxy for a 
students’ home environment. 
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T = teachers’ individual characteristics, such as certification, possession of an advanced degree, 
and grade level/subject matter taught (e.g. high-school math), 
S = school characteristics, such as school size, mean achievement test score, average student 
demographics and disciplinary incidents, 
C = characteristics of the classes a teacher is assigned, such as student demographics, 
achievement test scores, class size and student disciplinary incidents 
4  Data 
A number of previous studies have investigated teacher turnover using datasets at the state level (e.g.  
Imazeki (2004), Theobald and Gritz (1996), Hanushek et al. (2004), Podgursky et al. (2004), Brewer 
(1996), Murnane and Olsen (1989b, 1990)).  A potential drawback of these single-state studies is that they 
cannot distinguish between teachers who take a teaching job in another state or in a private school and 
those who exit the profession entirely.  Also, there is the issue of whether findings in a particular state are 
relevant to the rest of the nation.    
Teacher turnover has also been studied using nationally representative datasets such as the 
Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and the associated teacher follow-up surveys (TFS) (e.g. Arnold et al. 
(1993), Ingersoll (2001), Shen (1997), Smith and Ingersoll (2004)).  While national in scope, the SASS 
data has more limited information than some state administrative databases and only follows teachers for 
one year.  
For the current study I employ both a national dataset, the 1999-2000 SASS and associated TFS, 
as well as a statewide administrative dataset from Florida, known as the Florida Education Data 
Warehouse (FL-EDW).  The combination of these two datasets will overcome many of the data limitations 
experienced in previous studies.  I describe both of these datasets in more detail below. 
Overview of the 1999-2000 SASS Data 
The Schools and Staffing Survey (SASS) and Teacher Follow-up Survey (TFS) is the nation’s largest 
sample survey of America’s elementary and secondary schools and is conducted every four years.  All 
elementary and secondary schools are divided into four exclusive categories, public schools, public charter 
schools, Bureau of Indian Affairs schools, and private schools. For each type of school, three sets of 
surveys are administered covering teachers, principals and the school. For public schools, their 
corresponding school district is also interviewed. The most recent survey is SASS-TFS 1999-2000. The 
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1999-2000 SASS surveys teachers during the 1999-2000 school year and the TFS surveys a partial list of 
those teachers one year later.  TFS includes all former teachers but only a sub-sample of current teachers. 
SASS data include details on the demographics of a teacher, such as age, sex, and race. In 
addition, SASS has information on the student racial composition of a school and district salary 
information. But SASS only includes the following classroom-level information: average class size, percent 
of students with an Individualized Education Plan (ie. students with disabilities), and percent of students 
with Limited English Proficiency.  
Overview of the Florida Education Data Ware-house (FL-EDW) data 
Previous research on teacher turnover has focused on the general characteristics of a teacher’s 
school. For example, Hanushek et al. (2004) uses average test scores, the percentage of students eligible 
for subsidized lunch programs, the percentage of black students, and the percentage of Hispanic students. 
However, a teacher’s work environment is most closely tied to the abilities and behavior of the students in 
her/his classroom rather than the school as a whole. The data from the FL-EDW allows matching of 
students and teachers to specific classrooms. Thus the FL-EDW data provides a unique opportunity to 
observe the impact of classroom-level variables, including class size, the behavior of students (measured 
by discipline incidents), and student achievement on the underlying dynamics of teacher exit decisions.  
In addition to the comprehensive nature of the data available in Florida, there are two additional 
factors that make Florida particularly attractive as a laboratory for analyzing the determinants of teacher 
turnover.  First, Florida is relatively isolated from neighboring states.  Florida is bordered on three sides 
by water and the northern border area is relatively sparsely populated compared to the central and 
southern parts of the state.  This reduces the problem of teachers teaching in border states.  Second, 
because Florida has in place a constitutional amendment that limits class size, class sizes are less likely to 
be a function of teacher ability, mitigating possible endogeneity bias.  
For all teachers who were teaching in a Florida public school during school year 2001-2002 and 
2002-2003, the FL-EDW provides a record for each class he or she taught in October of the relevant year. 
Every spring the State of Florida administers the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Tests in reading and 
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in math to students in grades 3 through 10.15  Two types of tests are administered. The first one is the 
FCAT Norm Referenced Test (NRT), a version of the Stanford-9 achievement test.  This is a vertically 
scaled exam where students making normal progress will achieve higher scores in each successive grade 
level.  The second test, the FCAT Sunshine State Standards Test (SSS), is a criterion-referenced test where 
the mean score is equivalent across grade levels.  Thus a student making normal progress would earn the 
same FCAT-SSS score in successive years.  To avoid complications with differing grade-level mean scores 
I employ the FCAT-SSS score as my metric of student ability. 
For each class, I determine the average classroom characteristics such as mean student test 
scores, number of disciplinary incidents per student, proportion of gifted students, proportion of students 
eligible for free or reduced lunch, proportion of Limited English Proficiency students, and the shares of 
students who are black and who are Hispanic.  Lagged test scores and lagged discipline incidents are 
employed to avoid possible simultaneity between a teacher’s ability and the behavior and performance of 
her students.  I then match each teacher to all of the classes she taught in October 2001 and I average the 
individual classroom characteristics across all of her classes.16 
To compare the current study with earlier studies which use school-level information on student 
characteristics (Hanushek, Kain, Rivkin(2004), Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner(2003), Boyd, 
Lankford, Loeb, Wyckoff(2005)), I also include school average measures of student demographics, 
behavior and test scores in the analysis. 
In terms of sample selection, I only include regular full-time teachers teaching in traditional (non-
charter) public schools. I also restrict the sample to teachers aged 19 through 70 and eliminate teachers 
simultaneously teaching in more than one school.  The later restriction is imposed in order to positively 
link each teacher to school characteristics. In addition, therapists and substitute teachers are also 
excluded from the sample.17 Additionally only teachers who actually taught one or more classes are 
included.18 Appendix 1 provides a list of variable names and definitions.  
                                                 
15 For details of the Florida Comprehensive Assessment Test, see the following website: 
http://www.firn.edu/doe/sas/fcat/handbk/fcathandbook.html  
16 Other than test scores and the average number of disciplinary incidents per student, all other classroom measures 
are in percentage terms.  
17 Therapists include the following: occupation therapist, speech-language pathologist, physical therapist, music 
therapist, recreation therapist, and therapy assistants.  
18 It is possible that a teacher may be engaged in supervisory or administrative duties and not be the primary 
instructor for any particular class.  
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5. Results 
Descriptive Statistics 
Since the Florida Education Data Warehouse only tracks teachers as long as they are teaching in a 
Florida public school, teachers who move to private schools or who leave the state to teach in another 
state are classified as “leavers”. In order to assess the impact of possible misclassification, I use data from 
the 1999-2000 SASS and 2000-2001 TFS to investigate the extent of possible misclassification. Since 
SASS-TFS is a nationally representative sample, it is able to track teachers who leave public schools to 
teach in private schools or teachers who left the state but still were teaching.  
From Table 1, the percent of teachers who leave public schools is about 8.3% while the percent of 
teachers who no longer teach at all is 7.3%. Therefore about one-eighth of teachers departing public 
schools in a given state move to private schools or take a teaching job in another state. For Florida, the 
percentage of teachers leaving public schools in a given year is 11.5%, about three percentage points 
higher than the national average. This percentage is consistent with a 2003 report on Florida’s teacher 
retention which indicated 13.9% teachers aged between 20-29 left classrooms after a year in 1997.19  
Consistent with earlier studies (Hanushek, et al. (2004)), teachers with fewer years of experience 
are more likely to leave teaching than their more experienced counterparts. Table two shows that for 
teachers with 0-2 years of experience, the percentage of teachers who left teaching is about 5.3% while 
teachers with 11-30 years of experience, the percentage of teachers who left teaching is only 2.3%. 20 
Table 3 shows that on average teachers who left Florida public schools tend to have students who 
scored lower on both the Norm-Referenced test and the Sunshine Standards test. For example, the 
average student performance on the math portion of the Sunshine State Standards test for teachers who 
left is 9 points lower than the average student performance on the same test for teachers who stayed in 
teaching. On average, teachers who left have a higher proportion of black students in their classroom, 
about four percentage points greater than their counterparts who stayed in teaching. For teachers who 
                                                 
19 Florida Department of Education (2003). 
20 As noted in Table 2, there are a significant number of missing values for teacher experience in the dataset. I am 
working on a program to impute experience data based on values for the same teacher in other years.  
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stayed in teaching, they tend to have more gifted students,21 slightly more Limited English Proficient 
Students, and fewer students with a history of disciplinary problems in their classrooms.  
Regression Results – Full Sample of Florida Teachers 
For the rest of the discussion, unless otherwise specified, I present probit estimates of the 
probability of not teaching in 2002-2003 based on teacher, classroom and school characteristics observed 
in 2001-2002.  The regressions include district fixed effects and account for clustering of errors at the 
school level.  
Table 4 shows the main results of this paper. There are three sets of results presented. First I 
estimate a baseline model (model 1.) that is similar to those estimated in previous research.  This baseline 
model includes school characteristics, teacher characteristics and interactions between teacher 
race/ethnicity and the racial/ethnic composition of students. This baseline model is very similar to those 
estimated by Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2004) for Texas teachers and by Scafidi, Sjoquist, and 
Stinebrickner (2003) with Georgia teachers. However, I add a new variable, not available in the Texas and 
Georgia data, the average number of disciplinary incidents at the school level. This variable captures 
another non-pecuniary aspect of the working condition for teachers. To measure student performance I 
only use the score from the mathematics portion of the statewide exam to avoid multicollinearity that 
would arise because of the high correlation between reading and mathematics scores.  
Contrary to Hanushek, Kain, and Rivkin’s (2004) results for Texas teachers, higher average 
student achievement at the school level is not significantly correlated with teacher exit.  Similar to what is 
found in both Texas and Georgia, the higher the percentage of black students at a school, the more likely 
teachers are to leave the public schools. However, the interaction between black teacher and black 
students is not statistically significant, suggesting that teaching students of one’s own race does not affect 
a teacher’s decision to leave teaching. Generally speaking, they are less likely to leave teaching than non-
Hispanic white teachers.  However, their employment decision is not affected by the proportion of 
Hispanic students at the school. 
Unlike what is found for Georgia teachers (Scafidi, Sjoquist, and Stinebrickner(2003)), holding 
the student racial composition constant, Florida teachers tend to leave schools with a higher proportion of 
                                                 
21 In Florida, admission to gifted programs is based on IQ scores, not previous academic achievement. 
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poor students. Teachers with a bachelor’s degree only and teachers with regular certification are less likely 
to leave teaching, all else equal. Consistent with Imazeki (2004) and Murnane and Olsen(1989b), higher 
salaries reduces the probability of exit.  
The significance of the estimated effects of student characteristics are likely biased downward 
because they are based on school-wide averages, not the characteristics of a teacher’s own classroom.  If 
there is significant variation in the makeup of classrooms within a school, then use of school average 
characteristics generates significant measurement error.  To correct for this I estimate a model with 
teacher-specific student characteristics.  
Column (2.) in Table 4 presents the estimated effects of classroom characteristics on the leaving 
decision. Examining each teacher’s classes I find that increases in lagged mean student achievement are 
associated with a reduced probability of teacher exit.  In addition, the lagged average number of discipline 
incidents for students a teacher taught is positively correlated with the likelihood of leaving.22  
Additionally, having more economically disadvantaged students (indicated by free/reduced-price lunch 
eligibility) also increases the probability of leaving.  
In order to test the relative importance of the school characteristics and classroom characteristics, 
I also estimate a model that includes both school-level and teacher-specific student characteristics. The 
results are presented in column (3.) of Table 4.  Both class-level student achievement and discipline 
remain statistically and quantitatively significant.23 while the only statistically significant school-level 
characteristic is the school-wide average number of discipline incidents.  If student discipline serves as a 
proxy for the safety of the campus environment then the result has a straightforward interpretation; 
teachers care about the ability and behavior of students they teach, they aren’t affected by the ability of 
students taught by others, but they do care about safety outside of their own classroom.  
One interesting and somewhat unexpected result is that the average size of classes taught does not 
significantly effect the probability of exit.  This suggests that the small sample of New York teachers 
studied by Mont and Rees (1996) may not be representative or that their class-size measure was capturing 
                                                 
22 The class-level achievement and discipline-incident variables are measured in the previous year for the current 
group of students (ie. last-year’s test scores of this year’s students) and thus avoid potential bias arising from the 
simultaneity between unmeasured teacher quality and student performance and behavior.  
23 Holding other factors constant, a one-standard deviation in average class-level test scores above the overall mean is 
associated with a reduction in the probability of leaving from 0.095 to 0.089 or over a five-percent reduction in the 
attrition rate.  Similarly, a one-standard-deviation reduction in the lagged number of discipline incidents per student 
reduces the probability of exit from 0.095 to 0.091.  
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the effects of other classroom characteristics left unmeasured in their model.24  It may be that class 
composition is much more important to teachers than the total number of students.  If this is indeed the 
case then efforts to reduce class size, while potentially improving student achievement, will not 
significantly impact the problem of teacher attrition. 
Results for Subpopulation of Young Florida Teachers 
As noted above, attrition is especially high among teachers early in their careers.  To see if the 
determinants of exit are the same for young teachers as for teachers as a whole I re-estimate the exit 
model using only the sub-set of teachers with zero to five years of experience.25 Focusing on young 
teachers also addresses another potential problem with the current research design.  Since the current 
analysis only spans two school years, I am implicitly assuming that the October 2001-02 class 
assignments are representative of the classes a teacher has been assigned in the past (and expects to be 
assigned in the future).  This assumption is more tenable for teachers early in their careers since 2001-
2002 will represent a large fraction of their entire teaching history. 
Judging from the pseudo R-squared, the model has greater explanatory power for the sub-sample 
of teachers early in their careers relative to the entire population of teachers.  This is consistent with the 
notion that the classroom in October of 2001 is more representative of a teacher’s entire history for young 
teachers.  
For all models, the classroom achievement score loses its significance, suggesting that young 
teachers are less sensitive to the ability level of the students they teach than their more senior colleagues.  
Comparing the model with both school-level and classroom-level characteristics (column 3.) with the 
comparable model for all teachers presented in column 3 of Table 4, we see that student misbehavior 
continues to increase the likelihood of teacher departure.  For teachers early in their careers, increases in 
the proportion of students with limited English proficiency also heightens the probability of exit. 
                                                 
24 The lack of an effect of class size on teacher employment decisions is not a result of class-size limitations in Florida.  
Implementing legislation for Florida’s class size initiative was not signed into law until June 2003, after the current 
period of study. 
25 Unfortunately, due to some gaps in the data, I do not currently have complete information on experience for all 
teachers.  Those teachers with missing experience information are disproportionally teachers who left teaching.  As 
shown in Table 2, 52% of them left teaching.  It is quite likely that many young teachers are included in this missing 
experience category.  In a future draft I will inpute experience based on pre- and post experience information 
therefore mitigating this problem. 
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Results for Subpopulation of Florida Teachers with SAT Scores 
In addition to sheer numbers, there is concern that teacher attrition may reduce overall teacher 
quality by draining away the best teachers.  If teaching ability is correlated with the value of non-teaching 
employment opportunities, than one would expect superior teachers to be more likely to leave unless 
there is differential pay or other compensation.26  To determine the affect of a teacher’s general ability on 
the probability of leaving, I re-estimate my exit model with the addition of a variable representing the 
Scholastic Aptitude (SAT)-equivalent college entrance exam score of future teachers.27  The data on 
college entrance exam scores comes from the student records of Florida public universities and 
community colleges, which are only available from 1995 forward.  Thus the sample is limited to teachers 
who entered a Florida public university or community college in the 1996-1996 school year and had a 
valid test score.  Thus the sample is not representative sample of all Florida public school teachers. On 
average they are younger, with an average age of 27 while the average age for the full sample is 44. In 
addition, the percentage of leavers for this sample is 4.5% whereas the sample used in the baseline model 
is 10.25%.28 
The results from Table 6 indicate that college exam scores are positively correlated with the 
likelihood of exit, though the estimates are only marginally significant (t=1.62).  The lack of precision is 
likely due to the relatively small sample of teachers with college entrance exam information.  Data for the 
2003-2004 school year has recently become available, so that future analysis can look at Florida teachers 
who taught in 2002-2003.  This later sample should contain a much larger number of teachers with pre-
service information and will thus likely yield more precise estimates of the relationship between the 
aptitude of teachers and their decisions to stay or leave public schools.  
Results for Teachers Nationwide Using the SASS-TFS 
The results from Florida suggest that teachers care about their classroom assignments, 
particularly the ability and behavior of the students they must teach. To check the robustness of these 
                                                 
26 For example, if the non-pecuniary psychic benefits of teaching are higher for more able teachers, this could 
outweigh their higher value in alternative employment. 
27 In Florida, high-school entrants to four-year universities may take either the American College Test (ACT) or SAT 
exam.  High school graduates initially entering community colleges predominately take a computerized placement 
test or CPT.  Scores on the CPT and ACT have been converted to SAT-equivalent scores based on concordance scales 
provided by the Florida Department of Education. 
28 The differential is due in part to missing experience data, which is currently being rectified.  See note 24 above. 
16 
findings I analyze data from the nationally representative 1999-2000 SASS-TFS survey.  The SASS-TFS 
data are weighted to account for the fact that the TFS includes all former teachers but only a sub-sample 
of current teachers. Due to the limited number of classroom-level variables available in SASS-TFS, I 
compare the SASS-TFS results with a re-formulation of the Florida model that only uses covariates 
contained in SASS-TFS.  
The results, presented in Table 7, indicate some similarities and differences between the estimates 
from Florida versus the nation as a whole.  Across both data sets, teachers who are older, un-certified, and 
hold an advanced degree are more likely to exit public schools.  Surprisingly, the probability of exit is not 
correlated with teacher pay in the SASS-TFS data whereas the expected negative correlation is found in 
the Florida data.  Larger classes are found to increase the probability of departure in the SASS-TFS data 
but not for Florida teachers.  Increases in the proportion of economically disadvantaged students are 
positively correlated with exit of Florida teachers, but not for the U.S. as a whole.   
6. Summary, Conclusions and Future Research 
With the increasing demand for teachers in the United States, now more than ever it is important to 
understand why teachers are exiting the profession.  Previous analyses of teacher attrition rarely control 
for all of the important pecuniary and non-pecuniary factors that affect the employment decisions of 
teachers.  In particular, the present study is the first large-scale analysis to link teachers to the students 
they teach and evaluate the impact of classroom environment on teacher attrition. 
I find that Florida public school teachers with higher achieving students (measured by lagged 
achievement test scores) and with a smaller proportion of students with a history of disciplinary problems 
are more likely to remain in the classroom.  This suggests that the classroom assignments of new teachers, 
who are inherently more likely to exit, can be a significant element in policies designed to promote teacher 
retention.  In contrast, I find mixed evidence on the impact of class size.  For Florida teachers, there is no 
statistically significant relationship between the size of a teacher’s classes and her likelihood of continuing 
to teach in a public school.  A negative relationship between class size and teacher retention is found for 
the nation as a whole based on data from the Schools and Staffing Survey. 
In addition to the classroom environment, I find that exit is negatively correlated with teacher 
pay, indicating that recent initiatives in many states to boost teacher pay may in fact help ameliorate the 
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problem of teacher attrition.  Further, there is some evidence that more able teachers (measured by 
college entrance exam scores) are more likely to leave public school teaching, suggesting that reducing 
teacher attrition may also aid in promoting teacher quality. 
Although the present analysis sheds new light on the factors affecting teacher attrition, much 
work remains to be done.  The present analysis suggests that class assignments are important to teachers’ 
occupational choices.  I intend to further explore this avenue by considering the impacts of variation in 
student abilities (e.g. the standard deviation in test scores within a class) and the subject-matter 
assignment (in-field versus out-of-field) on the likelihood a teacher exits the public school system.  I also 
intend to extend the time period of analysis to obtain more precise estimates of the relationship between 
the scholastic aptitude of teachers and their likelihood of exiting the teaching profession.  I also plan to 
consider other elements of teachers’ pre-service background, such as their college coursework and major.  
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Table 1. Comparison of Percentage of Leavers in Florida with National Sample from 
SASS 
 
 FL teachers SASS teachers 
Percentage of Leavers of 
the Public School System in 
Florida 
11.5% 8.3% 
Percentage of True Leavers 
Who Left Teaching 
NA 7.3% 
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Table 2. Numbers and Percentage of Teachers Leaving Teaching by Experience Level  
 
Florida Teachers 
 2001-02 to 2002-03 
 
Numbers of Teachers 
Left Teaching 
Total Numbers of 
Teachers 
Percentage of Teachers 
Left Teaching 
Experience 0-2 
years 
932 17,577 5.3% 
Experience 3-5 
years 
542 17,485 3.1% 
Experience 6-10 
years 
590 19,046 3.1% 
Experience 11-30 
years 
1,074 46,716 2.3% 
Experience 30 or 
more years 
94 4,456 2.1% 
Experience 
missing 
11,503 22,121 52.0% 
All Experience 
Levels 
14,655 127,434 11.5% 
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Table 3. Classroom Characteristics for Florida Teachers, 2001-2002  
 
Average Characteristics of Classes Taught in 2001-2002 Status in 
2002-03 
 Left 
Teaching 
Still 
Teaching 
Percent Limited English Proficiency Students 11.9% 12.0% 
Percent of Special Education Students  27.8% 24.6% 
Class Size 19.95 21.47 
Discipline Incidents per Pupil 0.53 0.43 
Percent Black Students 28.2% 24.2% 
Percent Hispanic Students 20.3% 21.3% 
Percent Gifted Students 4.1% 4.9% 
Percent Students Receiving Free/Reduced-Price Lunch 50.0% 46.7% 
Norm-Referenced Test Math Score 662 668 
Norm-referenced Test Reading Score  660 665 
Sunshine State Standards Test Math Score 283 292 
Sunshine State Standards Reading Score  275 283 
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Table 4. Probit Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability a Teacher Leaves the 
Florida Public Schools, 2001/2002 – 2002/2003 
 
 (1)   (2)  (3)  
Teacher’s Age 0.0054 0.0047 0.0046 
 [0.0011]*** [0.0013]*** [0.0013]*** 
Male Teacher 0.02666 0.01502 0.01425 
 [0.01666] [0.01740] [0.01749] 
Black Teacher 0.0006 0.0186 0.0126 
 [0.0338] [0.0386] [0.0396] 
Hispanic Teacher -0.0798 -0.0829 -0.0677 
 [0.0447]* [0.0534] [0.0548] 
Teacher Holds Advanced Degree  0.2973 0.3051 0.3060 
 [0.0350]*** [0.0393]*** [0.0393]*** 
Certified Teacher -0.3632 -0.3498 -0.3487 
 [0.0233]*** [0.0264]*** [0.0264]*** 
High School Teacher 0.0022 -0.0455 -0.0199 
 [0.0262] [0.0264]* [0.0303] 
Special Education Teacher 0.0233 -0.0801 -0.0568 
 [0.0206] [0.0479]* [0.0486] 
Middle School Teacher 0.0115 -0.0263 -0.0020 
 [0.0246] [0.0261] [0.0271] 
High School Math Teacher 0.0213 0.0278 0.0333 
 [0.0323] [0.0331] [0.0333] 
Middle School Math Teacher -0.0616 -0.0494 -0.0483 
 [0.0378] [0.0379] [0.0379] 
Log of Teacher Salary -0.7637 -0.7403 -0.7389 
 [0.0690]*** [0.0818]*** [0.0816]*** 
School Size -0.0000  -0.0000 
 [0.0000]  [0.0000] 
School-Level Mean Math Score -0.0003  -0.0004 
 [0.0005]  [0.0006] 
School-Level Mean Discipline  0.0008  -0.0600 
    Incidents per Student [0.0147]  [0.0208]*** 
School-Level Percent Free-Lunch 0.1188  0.0672 
    Students [0.0583]**  [0.0981] 
School-Level Percent Black 0.1304  -0.0213 
    Students [0.0652]**  [0.1141] 
School-Level Percent Hispanic  0.0073  0.0312 
    Students [0.0764]  [0.1240] 
Black Teacher x School-Level -0.0032  0.1969 
    Percent Black Students [0.0726]  [0.1917] 
Hispanic Teacher x School-Level  0.0837  -0.2732 
    Percent Hispanic Students [0.0917]  [0.1984] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Class Size  -0.0004 -0.0004 
  [0.0003] [0.0003] 
Black Teacher x Teacher-Specific  -0.0497 -0.2171 
    Mean Percent Black Students  [0.0762] [0.1751] 
Hispanic Teacher x Teacher-Specific  0.0593 0.2646 
    Mean Percent Hispanic Students  [0.0985] [0.1717] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Math Score  -0.0007 -0.0007 
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  [0.0003]*** [0.0003]** 
Teacher-Specific Mean Discipline  0.0190 0.0439 
    Incidents Per Student  [0.0093]** [0.0127]*** 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Limited  0.0852 0.0840 
    English Proficiency Students  [0.0524] [0.0580] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Black  0.0916 0.1043 
    Students  [0.0577] [0.0895] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent  -0.0934 -0.1066 
    Hispanic Students  [0.0671] [0.0987] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Gifted  0.1059 0.0793 
    Students  [0.0721] [0.0734] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Special   0.0099 -0.0043 
    Education Students  [0.0599] [0.0605] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Free-  0.0972 0.0178 
    Lunch Students  [0.0499]* [0.0778] 
    
Observations 75,474 56,150 56,091 
Pseudo R2 0.0540 0.0559 0.0564 
 
NOTES: Dependent variable equals one if a teacher has left teaching between school year 2000-01 and 
2001-02. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are in brackets (* significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  All models include school district (county) fixed 
effects. 
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Table 5. Probit Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability a Teacher Leaves the 
Florida Public Schools, 2001/2002 – 2002/2003  
 (Teachers with Five or Fewer Years of Experience) 
 
 (1)  (2)  
  
(3)  
Teacher’s Age 0.0033 0.0019 0.0016 
 [0.0019]* [0.0022] [0.0022] 
Male Teacher 0.01625 0.01168 0.01435 
 [0.05060] [0.05302] [0.05352] 
Black Teacher 0.0838 0.0773 0.0554 
 [0.0913] [0.1080] [0.1087] 
Hispanic Teacher -0.2779 -0.4006 -0.3678 
 [0.1197]** [0.1490]*** [0.1507]** 
Teacher Holds Advanced Degree  0.0263 -0.0189 -0.0193 
 [0.0820] [0.0942] [0.0943] 
Certified Teacher -0.0815 -0.0517 -0.0482 
 [0.0430]* [0.0497] [0.0496] 
High School Teacher -0.0198 -0.1778 -0.0988 
 [0.0808] [0.0774]** [0.0884] 
Special Education Teacher 0.0596 -0.1688 -0.1203 
 [0.0556] [0.1599] [0.1587] 
Middle School Teacher 0.0303 -0.0701 -0.0210 
 [0.0634] [0.0654] [0.0675] 
High School Math Teacher -0.1975 -0.2046 -0.1875 
 [0.1149]* [0.1225]* [0.1218] 
Middle School Math Teacher -0.3819 -0.3425 -0.3425 
 [0.1227]*** [0.1226]*** [0.1229]*** 
Log of Teacher Salary -0.0439 0.1124 0.1235 
 [0.0789] [0.1087] [0.1125] 
School Size -0.0001  -0.0001 
 [0.0000]**  [0.0000] 
School-Level Mean Math Score -0.0004  -0.0005 
 [0.0015]  [0.0018] 
School-Level Mean Discipline  -0.0232  -0.0845 
    Incidents per Student [0.0408]  [0.0561] 
School-Level Percent Free-Lunch Students -0.1029  0.0546 
 [0.1746]  [0.2879] 
School-Level Percent Black Students 0.4284  0.0691 
     [0.1774]**  [0.3080] 
School-Level Percent Hispanic  0.2053  0.3899 
    Students [0.2190]  [0.3599] 
Black Teacher x School-Level 0.0120  0.2380 
    Percent Black Students [0.1739]  [0.4411] 
Hispanic Teacher x School-Level  0.6342  -0.3046 
    Percent Hispanic Students [0.2604]**  [0.4990] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Class Size  -0.0008 -0.0006 
  [0.0009] [0.0007] 
Black Teacher x Teacher-Specific  0.0337 -0.1498 
    Mean Percent Black Students  [0.1889] [0.4087] 
Hispanic Teacher x Teacher-Specific  0.8666 1.0214 
    Mean Percent Hispanic Students  [0.2642]*** [0.4238]** 
Teacher-Specific Mean Math Score  -0.0001 -0.0002 
  [0.0008] [0.0008] 
27 
Teacher-Specific Mean Discipline Incidents  0.0168 0.0536 
    Per Student  [0.0247] [0.0293]* 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Limited  0.2368 0.2726 
    English Proficiency Students  [0.1510] [0.1628]* 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Black  0.3436 0.3096 
    Students  [0.1629]** [0.2444] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Hispanic  -0.1479 -0.3140 
    Students  [0.2014] [0.2807] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Gifted  0.0690 -0.0005 
    Students  [0.2545] [0.2581] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Special   0.1568 0.1382 
    Education Students  [0.1962] [0.1961] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Free-Lunch   0.0856 -0.0679 
    Students  [0.1592] [0.2465] 
    
Observations 17,832 13,249 13,241 
Pseudo R2 0.0582 0.0764 0.0780 
 
NOTES: Dependent variable equals one if a teacher has left teaching between school year 2000-01 and 
2001-02. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are in brackets (* significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  All models include school district (county) fixed 
effects. 
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Table 6. Probit Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability a Teacher Leaves the 
Florida Public Schools, 2001/2002 – 2002/2003  
 (Teachers with College Entrance Exam Information) 
 
 (1)  (2)   (3)  
Teacher’s Age 0.0177 0.0185 0.0184 
 [0.0065]*** [0.0082]** [0.0081]** 
Male Teacher 0.14978 0.16608 0.16929 
 [0.13842] [0.15171] [0.15540] 
Black Teacher 0.3435 0.2312 0.2892 
 [0.2899] [0.4381] [0.4311] 
Hispanic Teacher -0.4229 -0.3448 -0.5106 
 [0.3051] [0.3461] [0.3548] 
Teacher Holds Advanced Degree  -0.1258 -0.3034 -0.3458 
 [0.3395] [0.4402] [0.4188] 
Certified Teacher -0.2915 -0.1139 -0.1400 
 [0.1220]** [0.1506] [0.1522] 
High School Teacher -0.1419 -0.1988 -0.0836 
 [0.2005] [0.2491] [0.2609] 
Special Ed. Teacher 0.1178 -0.6074 -0.5608 
 [0.1494] [0.4173] [0.4176] 
Middle School Teacher -0.0651 -0.2256 -0.1983 
 [0.1914] [0.2033] [0.2080] 
High School Math Teacher -0.0863 -0.1953 -0.1745 
 [0.3214] [0.3349] [0.3366] 
Middle School Math Teacher -0.2612 -0.0234 0.0032 
 [0.3317] [0.3230] [0.3193] 
Log of Teacher Salary 0.2824 0.5113 0.6835 
 [0.2798] [0.5831] [0.6271] 
Teacher’s SAT Score 0.0003 0.0007 0.0007 
 [0.0003] [0.0004] [0.0004] 
School Size -0.0001  -0.0002 
 [0.0001]  [0.0001] 
School-Level Mean Math Score 0.0026  0.0041 
 [0.0033]  [0.0051] 
School-Level Mean Discipline  0.0804  0.0853 
    Incidents per Student [0.1153]  [0.1460] 
School-Level Free Lunch Eligibility 0.4509  -0.5803 
 [0.4258]  [0.8422] 
School-Level Percent Black 0.6171  1.6712 
    Students [0.4290]  [0.8273]** 
School-Level Percent Hispanic  -0.5230  -1.0410 
    Students [0.5694]  [1.2554] 
Black Teacher x School-Level -0.5377  -0.4222 
    Percent Black Students [0.5184]  [1.6637] 
Hispanic Teacher x School-Level  1.4903  1.8675 
    Percent Hispanic Students [0.6153]**  [1.5147] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Class Size  -0.0007 -0.0006 
  [0.0024] [0.0021] 
Black Teacher x Teacher-Specific  -0.3178 -0.0383 
    Percent Black Students  [0.6751] [1.5907] 
Hispanic Teacher x Teacher-Specific  1.5459 0.2409 
    Percent Hispanic Students  [0.6938]** [1.3352] 
29 
Teacher-Specific Mean Math Score  0.0019 0.0014 
  [0.0030] [0.0030] 
Teacher-Specific Discipline Incidents  0.1043 0.0898 
  [0.0528]** [0.0584] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Limited  -0.2847 -0.6683 
    English Proficiency Students  [0.4882] [0.5917] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Black  0.2964 -0.7786 
    Students  [0.4274] [0.7155] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Hispanic  -0.6445 0.2683 
    Students  [0.6525] [0.9787] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Gifted  -2.0279 -2.5293 
    Students  [1.7379] [1.7797] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Special   0.3992 0.4173 
    Education Students  [0.5239] [0.5157] 
Teacher-Specific Percent Free-Lunch   0.8556 1.0939 
    Eligibility  [0.4353]** [0.7038] 
    
Observations 2103 1301 1301 
Psudo R2 0.0872 0.1258 0.1456 
 
NOTES: Dependent variable equals one if a teacher has left teaching between school year 2000-01 and 
2001-02. Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are in brackets (* significant 
at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  All models include school district (county) fixed 
effects.  
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Table 7. Probit Estimates of the Determinants of the Probability that a Public School 
Teacher Exits (Florida Teachers and Teachers Nationwide ) 
 
 (1) U.S. 
(SASS Data) 
(2) U.S. 
(SASS Data) 
(3) U.S. 
(SASS Data) 
(4) Florida 
 (FL-EDW)  
Teacher’s Age 0.0099 0.0142 0.0160 0.0053 
 [0.0038]** [0.0043]*** [0.0045]*** [0.0011]*** 
Male Teacher -0.09518 -0.10489 -0.11650 0.02899 
 [0.08884] [0.08290] [0.08928] [0.01656]* 
Black Teacher 0.3055 -0.0320 0.2662 -0.0016 
 [0.2333] [0.1395] [0.2800] [0.0337] 
Hispanic Teacher 0.2249 -0.3383 0.0237 -0.0790 
 [0.3149] [0.2036] [0.2967] [0.0447]* 
Teacher Holds Advanced Degree  0.1679 0.2712 0.2566 0.2980 
 [0.0737]** [0.0957]*** [0.0892]*** [0.0348]*** 
Certified Teacher -0.3319 -0.4009 -0.4094 -0.3629 
 [0.1251]*** [0.1534]** [0.1697]** [0.0233]*** 
High School Teacher 0.2778 0.1254 0.2681 0.0096 
 [0.0833]*** [0.0932] [0.1018]** [0.0245] 
Middle School Teacher -0.1464 -0.2655 -0.1337 0.0206 
 [0.1760] [0.2109] [0.2340] [0.0234] 
Special Education Teacher 0.0865 0.5445 0.6272 -0.0375 
 [0.2158] [0.4180] [0.3476]* [0.0355] 
High School Math Teacher 0.0469 0.0253 0.0144 0.0215 
 [0.1439] [0.1445] [0.1519] [0.0323] 
Middle School Math Teacher 0.6304 0.5869 0.7890 -0.0586 
 [0.5021] [0.5087] [0.5428] [0.0377] 
Log of Teacher Salary 0.0994 -0.0804 -0.0865 -0.7600 
 [0.1576] [0.1678] [0.1884] [0.0682]*** 
School Size -0.0001  -0.0001 -0.0000 
 [0.0001]  [0.0001] [0.0000] 
School-Level Percent Limited English   0.0107 0.0789 
    Proficiency Students   [0.0077] [0.1341] 
School-Level Percent Free Lunch  -0.0015  -0.0030 0.1112 
    Students [0.0019]  [0.0024] [0.0534]** 
School-Level Percent Black Students 0.0021  0.0021 0.1483 
 [0.0026]  [0.0026] [0.0604]** 
School-Level Percent Hispanic Students -0.0059  -0.0099 -0.0182 
 [0.0031]*  [0.0041]** [0.0832] 
Black Teacher x School-Level Percent -0.0076  -0.0054 0.0049 
    Black Students [0.0045]*  [0.0049] [0.0724] 
Hispanic Teacher x School-Level Percent 0.0026  -0.0036 0.0781 
    Hispanic Students [0.0070]  [0.0066] [0.0911] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Class Size  0.0032 0.0088 -0.0004 
  [0.0043] [0.0051]* [0.0002] 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Special  -0.0047 -0.0045 0.0828 
    Education Students  [0.0039] [0.0030] [0.0394]** 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Limited   0.0026 0.0043 0.0363 
    English Proficiency Students  [0.0026] [0.0035] [0.0406] 
Observations 4156 4156 4156 76226 
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors corrected for clustering at the school level are in brackets (* significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%).  For SASS data, schools are classified into three categories: 
elementary school, secondary school, and combined school while FL-EDW schools are classified into three 
categories: elementary school, middle school, and high school. Models using SASS data include state fixed 
effects while the model using Florida data includes school district (county) fixed effects.  
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Appendix 1. Variable Names and Definitions 
 
Variable Names  Definition 
Leaver Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher has left Florida public school 
system in year 2002-2003 
Age Teacher’s age in 2001 
Male Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is male 
Black Teacher  Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is non-Hispanic Black 
Hispanic Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is Hispanic 
Certified Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is certified in teaching 
Advanced Degree  The teacher holds a masters degree or above 
High School Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is a high school teacher 
Middle School Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teachers is a middle school teacher 
High School Math Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is a high school math teacher 
Middle School Math Teacher Dummy variable equal to one if the teacher is a middle school math 
teacher 
Log of Salary Teacher base year salary in log terms 
School Size School enrollment 
School Level Math Score School average student performance on the math portion of the Sunshine 
State Standards 
School Level Disciplinary Incidents School average number of disciplinary incidents per student 
School Level Free Lunch Percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch program 
School Level Percent Black Percent of Black students at a school 
School Level Percent Hispanic Percentage of Hispanic students at a school 
Hispanic Teacher x School Level 
Percent Hispanic 
The interaction term between Hispanic teacher and percent of Hispanic 
students 
Black Teacher x School Level Percent 
Black 
The interaction term between black teacher and percent of black students 
Teacher-Specific Mean Class Size Number of Students per Class averaged over all classes taught during 
October 2001 
Teacher-Specific Mean Math Test 
Score 
Class mean student performance on the math portion of the Sunshine 
State Standards test averaged over all classes a teacher taught during 
October 2001 
Teacher-Specific Mean Disciplinary  
Incidents per Student 
Class mean discipline incidents per student averaged over all classes a 
teacher taught during October 2001 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Free-
Lunch Students 
Class-level percentage of students eligible for free and reduced lunch 
program averaged over all classes a teacher taught during October 2001  
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent Black 
Students 
Class-level percent black students averaged over all classes a teacher 
taught during October 2001 
Teacher-Specific Mean Percent  
Hispanic Students 
Class-level percent Hispanic students averaged over all classes a teacher 
taught during October 2001 
Hispanic Teacher x Teacher-Specific 
Mean Percent Hispanic Students 
The interaction term between Hispanic teacher and percent of Hispanic 
students at class level 
Black Teacher x Teacher-Specific Mean 
Percent Black Students 
The interaction term between black teacher and percent of black students 
at class level 
Teacher-Specific Percent Limited 
English Proficiency Students 
Class-level percent of students with Limited English Proficiency averaged 
over all classes a teacher taught during October 2001 
Teacher-Specific Percent Gifted 
Students 
Class-level percent of students classified as gifted averaged over all classes 
a teacher taught during October 2001  
Class Level Percent Special Education 
Students 
Class-level percent exceptional education students (excluding gifted 
students)  averaged over all classes a teacher taught during October 2001  
 
 
